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A common narrative links the recent developments of the 
jihadist scene in North Africa to the toppling of the Tunisian 
and Libyan dictatorships and their tightly controlled secu-
rity apparatuses. This narrative drives the propaganda of the 
remaining strongmen in the region, who portray themselves 
as the best antidote to al-Qaeda in particular, and terrorism 
in general. Western intelligence, overwhelmingly critical of 
NATO’s anti-Gadhafi campaign, also tends to share this view, 
preferring stability and thus placing their trust in collaborative 
authoritarian regimes.
The main flaw of this ‘counter-revolutionary’ narrative is 
its lack of historical perspective. The whole story of jihadism 
in North Africa started two decades ago, when the Algerian 
army ‘suspended’ the electoral process in 1992 that would have 
brought the local Islamists to power, precipitating a horren-
dous civil war. Understanding the roots and mutations of 
Algerian jihadism reveals how a complex and volatile situation 
has coalesced today around competing poles and networks.
Its history begins in Algeria, which became the cradle of an 
enduring version of jihadism that expanded through the Sahara 
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in the form of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), before 
being rolled back from Mauritania. It continues with the birth 
and growth of a new brand of jihadist outfit, Ansar al-Sharia, 
in the aftermath of the Tunisian and Libyan revolutions. The 
third section addresses the rise and fall of the AQIM-linked 
‘Jihadistan’ in Northern Mali, with the recent development of 
an ambitious movement, al-Mourabitoun, led by an Algerian 
veteran. It concludes with a discussion of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and its implications for global and 
regional jihadism.
Algeria’s jihadists and Mauritania’s roll-back
The Islamic Armed Group (GIA) was the main jihadist organi-
sation fighting the Algerian regime in the 1990s.1 As the civil 
war dragged on, the GIA also intensified its struggle against 
the rival Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Although they were 
often nicknamed ‘Afghans’ because of their Salafist attire, only 
a small minority of the Algerian jihadists actually fought in 
Afghanistan against Soviet forces (before their withdrawal 
in 1989). Among those veterans was Mokhtar Belmokhtar, or 
Belaouar, ‘the one-eyed man’ (he reportedly lost an eye while 
fighting in the Afghan province of Khost in 1991).
Belmokhtar, born in the oasis of Ghardaia, was based in the 
Algerian Sahara, where he handled various logistics operations 
for the GIA. A shrewd smuggler himself, Belmokhtar built over 
several years an intricate network of criminal partnerships in 
the Sahel region.2 Soon he was nicknamed ‘Mister Marlboro’ 
for his trafficking of tobacco, though he also smuggled drugs 
and arms. Such ‘un-Islamic’ dealings were either ignored or 
justified by an obligation to defeat the kuffâr (infidels) by any 
means necessary.
On the eastern border with Libya, a much smaller smug-
gling network operated on behalf of the GIA. One of its main 
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ringleaders was Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, who boasted of 
dealing only in computers and tea, in order to enhance his 
pious credentials. Neither Belmokhtar nor Abou Zeid engaged 
in insurgency activities then. But they eventually joined the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998 when 
it broke away from a GIA responsible for a wave of mass kill-
ings and plagued by internal purges.
The collapse of the GIA led the Algerian military to proclaim 
victory, while acknowledging there remained ‘residual terror-
ism’, mostly in the mountainous range of Kabylia, east of the 
capital Algiers. Abou Zeid rose in the hierarchy of the GSPC but 
operated mostly in its smuggling underworld. Belmokhtar, by 
contrast, sought to emphasise his leadership capacities, naming 
the katiba (battalion) of his supporters ‘al-Moulathamoun’, the 
Veiled Ones, with reference to warring tribes who had spread 
Islam in the Sahara.
In 2004, both Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid pledged alle-
giance to the new GSPC emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, who had 
joined the jihadi insurgency at the same time as them and had 
managed to escape military raids and purges. Droukdel strove 
to globalise the GSPC network by connecting it to the anti-US 
jihad in Iraq. GSPC training camps in eastern Algeria attracted 
hundreds of militants from all over North Africa, eager to fight 
against the ‘Crusaders’ in the Middle East.3
In 2005, Belmokhtar declared jihad against Mauritania, 
attacking an isolated outpost and slaughtering its whole garri-
son. He felt the need to boost his jihadist profile against an 
enemy that lacked the resources to strike back. This escalation 
led Belmokhtar to endorse Droukdel’s pledge of allegiance to 
Osama bin Laden, issued on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks.
In January 2007, the GSPC officially became al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Algerian capital was struck by 
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deadly suicide attacks in April and December that year. But 
AQIM failed to export its terror north of the Mediterranean, 
where it had no solid network or pool of supporters. So Droukdel 
turned to Belmokhtar in order to achieve AQIM’s global ambi-
tions. In the last days of 2007, Belmokhtar’s affiliates killed four 
French tourists in eastern Mauritania, and the Paris–Dakar car 
race was consequently moved to Latin America.
After years of restraint, Abou Zeid also escalated attacks. 
He initiated a chase for Western hostages all over the Sahara, 
compelling Belmokhtar to join the fray. The extremely mobile 
commandos struck from the coast of Mauritania to Southern 
Tunisia. The abductions brought unprecedented media expo-
sure to the two jihadist leaders, along with hefty ransoms that 
further extended their reach and influence.
Mauritania was hit repeatedly, even in the capital, 
Nouakchott. It took three years for the local army to gather the 
military and intelligence capabilities to launch a fully fledged 
offensive against AQIM. But in 2008–09, the organisation was 
rolled back from Mauritanian territory. That the Mauritanian 
state proclaimed its own jihad against those claiming to repre-
sent jihadists contributed significantly to the success of this 
campaign. 
Conversely, in Mali the failure of a military operation in July 
2009 led to the local army’s de facto abandonment of the north, 
limiting its control to the cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. 
Northern Mali became a safe haven for both Belmokhtar and 
Abou Zeid. Algerian cadres still formed the top leadership of 
AQIM, even in the Sahara, which convinced African jihadists 
to form their own outfit, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJAO). 
On the eve of the Tunisian revolution, Droukdel had become 
dependent on his subordinates in the Sahara. They supplied 
him with the financial resources and media exposure he badly 
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needed in his isolated stronghold of Kabylia. Mauritania had 
successfully liberated its territory from AQIM and often under-
took raids in neighbouring Mali. In Algeria, outbursts of residual 
terrorism occurred, but without affecting the political scene.
The Tunisian and Libyan revolutions 
AQIM remained quiet during the Tunisian uprising that ousted 
President Ben Ali in January 2011, ending 23 years of his dicta-
torship.4 In the euphoria of the revolution, all political detainees 
were unconditionally released. One was particularly problem-
atic. Seifallah Benhassine, nicknamed ‘Abou Iyad al-Tounissi’ 
(the Tunisian), was not a prisoner of conscience but the former 
leader of the Tunisian guest house in the radical community in 
Peshawar during anti-Soviet jihad. 
Abou Iyad became a key leader of the Islamic Tunisian 
Fighting Group (GICT), a partner of al-Qaeda, whose leader-
ship he interacted with frequently. In 2003, during one of his 
liaison missions in Turkey, he was arrested by the local police 
and extradited to Tunisia. He was condemned to 63 years in 
jail for terrorist activities, including masterminding the killing 
of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Afghan commander of the anti-
Taliban resistance, two days before 9/11.
 The revolution also prompted the return from exile of 
Rached Ghannouchi and the legalisation of his Islamist Ennahda 
(Renaissance) Party. The Islamist movement had been plagued 
by years of repression that had deepened a generational divide 
between the historic leadership, now released from jails or back 
from exile, and younger grassroots militants. Ennahda, despite 
its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, had grown into a catch-
all Islamist party that also included significant representation 
from Tunisia’s Salafists.
The post-revolutionary Tunisian landscape was therefore 
quite different from the Egyptian one, where a fully-fledged 
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Salafist party had developed independently of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Ennahda, however, sought to absorb and moder-
ate most of the Salafist militants. This would be crucial in the 
coming debates about the Tunisian Second Republic, whose 
constitution would replace the founding charter adopted after 
the end of the French protectorate in 1956.
Ennahda won 36% of the votes, but received 89 out of 
217 seats in the October 2011 elections for the Constituent 
Assembly. It entered into a coalition with a socialist party and 
a nationalist one to form a tripartite government chaired by 
Hamadi Jebali, Ennahda’s secretary-general. Throughout this 
period, Ghannouchi kept cajoling the Salafist ‘brothers’ in an 
effort to win over their networks instead of suppressing or 
marginalising them.
This tolerance substantially helped Abou Iyad expand his 
own organisation, which he named Ansar al-Sharia. Jebali and 
his minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh, silently disapproved of 
Ghannouchi’s lenient stance, but ultimately endured provo-
cations by Ansar al-Sharia. The secular opposition criticised 
Ennahda’s double standard, accusing the Islamist-led govern-
ment of playing with jihadi fire.
In contrast to the relatively peaceful revolution in Tunisia, 
the struggle against Gadhafi’s regime in Libya quickly became 
a full-blown civil war that lasted from February to October 
2011. Dissidents from the government army joined forces in 
the insurgency with jihadist veterans of the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG).5  In 2007, the LIFG had split between 
a Pakistan-based nucleus that merged into al-Qaeda, includ-
ing Abu Anas al-Libi, and its Libyan members who eventually 
rejected bin Laden’s mentorship and jihadist dogma in 2010. 6
After Gadhafi’s fall, the leader of this ‘reformed’ LIFG, 
Abdelhakim Belhaj,7 moved to Tripoli. He became the new 
military governor and founded a political party, al-Watan 
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(The Motherland). Meanwhile, in Benghazi, the cradle of the 
Libyan revolution, Muhammad al-Zahawi developed his own 
Ansar al-Sharia. Zahawi, like Abou Iyad, had been previously 
imprisoned. But he had never fought outside Libya, let alone in 
Afghanistan. There was no organisational or operational link 
between the Tunisian and Libyan Ansar al-Sharia groups, just 
a shared motivation to defy the paths chosen by the legalised 
Islamist or reformed jihadist parties.
In another contrast with the Tunisian revolution, Libyan 
Islamists fared poorly at the first elections; in July 2012, the 
local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, running as the Justice 
and Construction Party (JCP), won only 17 out of 80 party 
seats in the General National Congress (GNC); 120 seats of the 
200-member GNC were allotted to individuals not affiliated 
with any party. But the JCP was much better structured than 
its rival organisations and soon gained the loyalty of a sizeable 
number of ‘independent’ members of the Congress.
Belhaj’s Watan Party received less than 4% of the votes in 
the same contest. Nevertheless, he remained the only leader to 
play a significant role in both parliament and on the streets of 
Tripoli. The revolutionary militias (thuwar) continued to be the 
main source of power in the major cities. 
In September 2012, the dissemination on the internet of 
a video slandering the Prophet Muhammad was seized as a 
pretext by extremist groups to stir violent protests against US 
embassies and consulates in the region. On the 11th anniver-
sary of 9/11, the US consulate in Benghazi came under attack 
and the United States’ ambassador was killed, along with three 
of his compatriots. The Obama administration held Ansar 
al-Sharia responsible, suggesting an al-Qaeda connection to 
the attacks.
However, it appeared that local militia leaders, already 
responsible for summary executions of ‘traitors’ (revolu-
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tionary renegades from Gadhafi’s regime involved in earlier 
anti-Islamist crackdowns), had launched the deadly attack.8 US 
intelligence, focused on global threats, had underestimated the 
dangers of Benghazi warlords. In June 2014, the US captured a 
key suspect involved in the attacks, Ahmed Abu Khattala, and 
transported him to New York to face trial.
In Tunisia, there was no doubt that Ansar al-Sharia led an 
assault on the US Embassy in Tunis on 14 September 2012. The 
presidential guard had to intervene, killing five protesters. 
Abou Iyad staged a last defiant rally in a mosque in central 
Tunis before going underground. Jebali and Laarayedh had 
finally prevailed against Ghannouchi in imposing a tough line 
against Ansar al-Sharia. The Islamist-led government even let 
two Ansar al-Sharia hunger-strikers die in jail, rejecting their 
demands.
Then, in February 2013, Chokri Belaïd, a prominent leftist 
leader, was shot dead next to his home in Tunis. The murder 
was blamed on a Salafist death squad, but the political crisis, 
with a general strike and mass protests in the capital, led to 
the downfall of the Jebali government. Jebali tried to form a 
new technocratic cabinet without party representation, but 
Ghannouchi refused any devolution of power by Ennahda. 
Eventually, the former minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh, 
became prime minister and pursued a showdown with Ansar 
al-Sharia. The group’s annual conference in the city of Kairouan 
was banned and ensuing riots were supressed. The Tunisian 
public overwhelmingly supported this ‘iron fist’ policy, since 
Ansar al-Sharia had been accused of killing yet another promi-
nent leftist activist. For months, the security forces hunted 
down Ansar al-Sharia militants, eventually killing some of 
their armed hardliners.
But another shadow was looming on the horizon of the 
Tunisian revolution; AQIM, after repeated infiltrations, had 
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managed in June 2013 to consolidate a base in the Jebel Chambi, 
a mountainous range on the border with Algeria. Skirmishes 
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inflicted an unprec-
edented toll on the Tunisian military and police, who in turn 
protested against the Islamist-led government. The jihadist 
stronghold was eventually neutralised, although escape routes 
to Algeria did not allow the poorly equipped Tunisian forces to 
eliminate the threat once and for all.
Again, Algeria appeared to be the source of the jihadist 
spillover into neighbouring countries. The incapacity of post-
Gadhafi Libya to disarm the militias had also created fertile 
ground for cooperation between warlords, jihadists and 
smugglers. This created serious security concerns in southern 
Tunisia.9
In October 2013, US special forces captured Abou Anas 
al-Libi outside his Tripoli home. Abou Anas was a Libyan 
al-Qaeda associate wanted for the 1998 bombing of US embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania, who had returned to his native 
country after Gadhafi’s fall. But his capture aggravated the 
power struggle in Libya, prompting the brief abduction of 
the prime minister himself by a militia that accused him of 
complicity with the CIA.10 
In January 2014, three years after the Tunisian revolution, 
a new constitution was finally adopted and Ennahda relin-
quished the presidency, opening the way for a technocratic 
cabinet. This globally recognised success proved to be the best 
antidote to jihadist destabilisation for more than a year. But 
in March 2015, two jihadist commandos attacked the Bardo 
National Museum, in the same grounds as the Tunisian parlia-
ment. They killed more than 20 people before being gunned 
down by local security. Just three months later, a lone Tunisian 
gunman attacked tourists at a beach resort in Sousse, killing 39 
people.
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All three Tunisian terrorists had been trained in neighbour-
ing Libya, where the fight between the Tripoli-based Dawn 
coalition and its Tobruk-based Dignity alliance degenerated 
into a full-fledged civil war in 2014, with direct Egyptian and 
Emirati support on behalf of Dignity and long-stalled efforts by 
the United Nations (UN) to broker a national unity agreement. 
Dignity brands all its opponents as terrorists, while Dawn 
accuses former Gadhafi supporters of not being sufficiently 
committed to the revolution. Despite these mutual accusations, 
both Tripoli and Tobruk have been targeted by jihadist attacks. 
The political impasse, decline in governance and widespread 
warlordism has made Libya the most fertile ground for jihad-
ism in North Africa, even allowing ISIS to take root in 2015. 
The Mali Campaign and the rise of al-Mourabitoun
As the Arab uprisings were about to unfold, the two AQIM 
leaders in the Sahara, Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid, found safe 
havens in Northern Mali to pursue their own criminal activities 
and jihadist operations. In September 2010, Abou Zeid led an 
attack on the French expatriate compound in Arlit, a uranium 
facility in northern Mali. Seven hostages were abducted; three 
of them were released after several months, while the other 
four, all French nationals, were held captive for three years.
The complex negotiations on the fate of foreign hostages 
absorbed a lot of the attention of the two leaders. Belmokhtar 
relied on a mediator close to the president of Burkina Faso. 
But Abou Zeid favoured the intercession of Iyad Ag Ghali, a 
former guerrilla leader of the Touareg insurgency in northern 
Mali, who had returned home after a term as consul of Mali in 
the Saudi port city of Jeddah.
Touaregs have a long history of armed uprisings against 
the central government in Bamako since their first rebellion in 
1963. Iyad Ag Ghali, a partner in the most recent peace agree-
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ment with the Malian authorities (who rewarded him with 
the Jeddah consular assignment), with increasing frequency 
denounced the failure of Bamako to live up to its commitments 
to the Touaregs. But his association with Abou Zeid led him 
to adopt a sharply Islamist tone, eventually founding a new 
group, Ansar Eddine (Supporters of Religion).
Thousands of Malian Touaregs, including veteran anti-
Bamako guerrillas, found refuge in Libya and joined Gadhafi’s 
mercenary units known as the Islamic Legion. When the 
Libyan dictatorship collapsed in the autumn of 2011, the Legion 
disbanded and the Touareg fighters moved back to Mali, along 
with weaponry seized from Gadhafi’s caches. Most of them 
joined Ansar Eddine, empowering Iyad Ag Ghali with unprec-
edented force.
In January 2012, Ansar Eddine allied with the Touareg sepa-
ratist insurgency, the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (MNLA), Azawad being the Touareg denomination 
for northern Mali. Ansar Eddine and the MNLA took over the 
cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao in a matter of weeks. A mili-
tary coup in Bamako only accelerated the demise of the central 
government in the north of the country.
The MNLA proclaimed the independence of Azawad in 
March. But its victory was short lived, because Ansar Eddine, 
backed by AQIM and the MUJAO, turned against its former 
allies to consolidate full jihadist control of northern Mali. Each 
of the jihadist groups had its own fiefdom: Ansar Eddine in 
Kidal, AQIM in Timbuktu and the MUJAO in Gao. Belmokhtar 
had been marginalised by the close cooperation between Abou 
Zeid and Iyad Ag Ghali.
Abou Zeid delivered the final blow to his Algerian rival in 
November by convincing Droukdel to expel Belmokhtar from 
AQIM. The charges against him ranged from embezzlement of 
hostage ransoms to a poor record in jihadist activism. A defiant 
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Belmokhtar chose to spend more time in southern Libya, where 
he benefitted from the local anarchy of the post-Gadhafi power 
vacuum.
Algeria bet on the peace talks it had sponsored between 
Ansar Eddine and the Malian government. The Algerian 
military was therefore incensed when Ansar Eddine and 
its jihadist allies launched an offensive towards the south of 
Mali in January 2013, occupying the strategic town of Konna. 
Bamako called Paris for help because the road to the capital 
was now open to jihadist commandos. 
The French response, known as Operation Serval, was swift 
and on a large scale. Algerian airspace was opened to the French 
air force, a dramatic move that underlined the shared concern 
about the jihadist threat. The UN, African Union and European 
Union endorsed the campaign and relied on US and British 
support with logistics and intelligence. Chadian commandos 
were also crucial in the ground operation.
In six weeks, the French military managed to stop the jihad-
ist push and roll back their units, before liberating the cities of 
Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. A merciless offensive in the extreme 
northeast of the country, in the Ametetai valley, successfully 
destroyed the jihadist stronghold there. French sources esti-
mated that 700 out of 2,000 jihadist fighters died in combat,11 
and Abou Zeid was killed while trying to flee. The ‘Jihadistan’ 
that AQIM, Ansar Eddine and the MUJAO had established in 
northern Mali lasted less than a year. While no weapons NATO 
had delivered to the Libyan insurgents in 2011 were found in 
jihadist caches, they were replete with arms plundered from 
Gadhafi’s arsenals. 
As his former partners were being routed in Mali, Belmokhtar 
masterminded a major terror attack that returned him to the 
centre of the jihadist scene. In January 2013, the oil complex of 
In Amenas in southern Algeria was taken over by commandos 
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comprising Belmokhtar’s supporters. The Algerian military 
eventually recaptured the facilities, but 40 hostages from ten 
countries were killed, along with 29 terrorists.12
Belmokhtar took credit for the operation, pushing both 
Droukdel and Abou Zeid into the shadows. The killing of 
Abou Zeid and dismantling of AQIM’s safe haven in Mali 
further served Belmokhtar’s plans to become the undisputed 
jihadist leader of the entire Sahara region. Southern Libya, in 
particular, offered unrivalled opportunities for the war-hard-
ened survivor and seasoned smuggler.
In May 2013, the MUJAO proved it had outlived AQIM by 
launching combined suicide attacks against military targets in 
Niger, including the city of Arlit. In August, Belmokhtar’s group 
and the MUJAO announced their merger into a new organ-
isation, al-Mourabitoun, a name that reflected the celebrated 
fighters who spread Islam in the Sahara in the 11th century. 
Did the French-led campaign simply displace the jihadist 
menace from northern Mali to southern Libya?  Belmokhtar 
and al-Mourabitoun may have found a new safe haven in 
southern Libya, but they are only one group in an area compli-
cated by rivalries between the ethnic-Tubu, Arab and Touareg 
tribes and feuds between revolutionaries and those nostalgic 
for the toppled dictatorship.
What made the prospect of a Malian ‘Jihadistan’ so danger-
ous was the process of association, and then identification, 
between Touareg irredentists and jihadists, similar to how 
Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan and Pakistan progressively 
blended with jihadist activists. Such a ‘Talibanisation’ process 
would have been devastating for the whole region, because 
sizeable Touareg communities exist not only in Mali and Libya, 
but also in Niger and Algeria. 
 Operation Serval was therefore not purely a military success. 
The French move paved the way for the rapid restoration 
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of Malian institutions, with general elections for the presi-
dency in August 2013 and parliament in November. The new 
head of state, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, won 77% of the votes. 
Significantly, he brought the former number two and three 
of Ansar Eddine into his presidential party. Although a new 
national pact has yet to bind northern Mali to the rest of the 
country, Keïta has the potential and mandate to draft and 
implement such a pact.
The new global appeal of the Middle East
The impact of Western military interventions in Libya and Mali 
are still difficult to evaluate. The NATO campaign against the 
Libyan dictatorship certainly prevented a wave of violence 
had Gadhafi defeated the rebels and been restored to abso-
lute power. Jihadists could have also played a bigger role in 
the insurgency, especially in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), in the 
absence of Western interference.
Nevertheless, NATO lacked the will to ensure a stabilised 
post-Gadhafi Libya. And, despite its dramatic success in 
dismantling the AQIM stronghold, the French intervention 
in Mali will depend on a reconciliation process between the 
central power in Bamako and Touareg activists. If mediation 
is required, it has to be regional, and most probably Algerian – 
definitely not Western.
Despite an aggressive campaign on jihadist websites, the 
French-led operation in Mali attracted very few volunteers from 
abroad – in sharp contrast to the Syrian war, which became 
a magnet for North African militants. Libyans and Tunisians 
rank among the top nationalities of foreign fighters in Syria, 
along with Saudis and Iraqis.13 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ 
leader, has openly challenged Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden’s 
official successor, for the supreme position in the globalised 
jihad.14 In this merciless feud, most North African jihadists 
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have tried to remain neutral, though this neutrality is already a 
blow to Zawahiri’s leadership.15 Maghrebi jihadists and volun-
teer fighters have more often supported ISIS, raising concerns 
among North African governments over how to manage these 
fighters when they return home. 
In conjunction with its expansion in Syria and Iraq, ISIS 
began to establish a foothold in the Libyan city of Derna in 
November 2014. Local supporters of al-Baghdadi attempted 
to create a base of operations where other radical factions had 
long resisted Ghadafi’s rule. But this proved to be a failed tactic. 
After ISIS assassinated a local jihadist commander in June 2015, 
its fighters were defeated in Derna. However, ISIS regrouped 
and seized the central city of Sirte, Gadhafi’s hometown, which 
had previously been under the control of militias from Misrata. 
The ongoing Libyan civil war between the Tobruk-based House 
of Representatives and the Tripoli-based GNC and their affili-
ated militias exacerbated the growth of jihadism because each 
side prioritised defeating the other over combatting the spread 
of ISIS. 
The ensuing power struggle for the leadership of the global 
jihad between Zawahiri and Baghdadi will be a major compo-
nent of jihadism in North Africa in the future. National contexts 
and factional feuds will also complicate the jihadist equation. 
One sure thing is that jihadism in North Africa will remain ‘a 
house of many mansions’, divided primarily between the rising 
influence of ISIS-affiliated factions, remaining AQIM members 
and opportunistic elements of al-Mourabitoun. 
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